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I.  Introduction and Background     
  There is a voluminous literature documenting transitions of welfare recipients to 
the labor market and the success of those transitions.  Welfare-to-work transitions are 
often found to be plagued by low pay, high turnover rates, and welfare recidivism (for 
example, see Lane and Stevens 1995, Hozer et al. 2004, Hoynes 2000, and Acs and 
Loprest 2004).  Much of this literature is limited in that the analysis includes only welfare 
recipients as the focus of analysis.
1  The absence of similarly skilled nonwelfare 
recipients in an analysis of labor market outcomes introduces the potential of 
confounding the behavior of welfare recipients with that of the behavior of low-skilled 
workers in general. 
  The purpose of the analysis in this paper is to quantify the labor market 
experience of former welfare recipients and to compare that experience to other, similarly 
low-skilled workers.  Identifying similarities and differences in labor market outcomes 
between welfare and nonwelfare hires will allow us to identify what part of that 
experience is unique to former welfare recipients and what part is common among all 
low-skilled workers.  If similar outcomes are identified, then policies aimed at improving 
labor market outcomes among welfare hires might be more effectively targeted at all low-
skilled workers.  
                                                 
1 Exceptions can be found in Loeb and Corcoran (2001) who find that wage growth is 
similar among welfare and nonwelfare recipients and Gunderson and Hotchkiss (2004) 
who find very similar job separation rates and reasons among welfare and nonwelfare 
recipients. 
1  
  This paper follows low-skilled workers (some of whom were welfare recipients) 
who separated from a single firm in the late 1990s.  Personnel data from the firm will 
provide demographic and job information for each worker.  The personnel records are 
linked to administrative data from the Georgia Department of Labor and the Georgia 
Department of Human Resources in order to assess the postseparation outcome for each 
worker.
2  The first analysis explores how the earnings among workers who separate 
compare with those who stay employed with the original employer (controlling for the 
decision to separate), whether the earnings experience differs across welfare status, and 
how important future earnings expectations are in the separation decision.  Efforts to keep 
welfare hires from separating from their employer may not be called for if they fare better 
than, or at least as well as, nonwelfare hires when they separate.  This analysis is 
followed by a closer look at the life after an employee separates to determine the likely 
outcome among four alternatives: return to welfare, no job, better job, or worse job.  This 
analysis explores the issue of welfare recidivism in greater detail and helps to shed light 
on the earnings outcomes of the first analysis. 
 
II.  Data 
 
  The data used in this study are from the personnel records of a large, unionized 
firm in the transportation industry with numerous domestic and international locations. 
Since the administrative data to which these workers will be linked are only available for 
the state of Georgia, the study is restricted to workers employed at firm locations in 
                                                 
2 Although the firm employs workers across the U.S. and internationally, due to data 
availability limitations only workers employed in Georgia are able to be followed in this 
study. 
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Georgia.
3  Due to the numerous different job types this firm employs, the focus will be 
on one particular type: part-time package sorters.  This part-time position typically 
involves working four to five hours a day, five days a week.  By focusing on one job 
type, this study provides for homogeneity in working conditions.
4  This homogeneity in 
job type is important since we don't have information on previous work experience.  
Presumably, individuals qualifying for this entry-level job have similar (very limited) 
work experience.  This type of work often involves heavy lifting, repetitiveness, and 
working conditions with extreme temperatures depending on the weather.  Since this job 
requires a relatively low level of skill, this is a typical job that a welfare recipient would 
be able to obtain (for example, see Loprest 2001, Wolman 1996, and Zill et al. 1991). 
  The data set was constructed by querying the firm’s personnel records for all 
employees (of this job type) hired from January 1, 1998, to December 31, 1999. These 
employees were then matched with other personnel tables to obtain data on demographic 
characteristics such as education and age, and job-related characteristics such as shift 
worked.  To be classified as a welfare hire, the individual must meet the welfare criteria 
applicable to the Work Opportunity Tax Credit (WOTC).  Qualified AFDC recipients 
were any individuals who were members of a family receiving AFDC (or a successor 
                                                 
3 One advantage to an analysis limited to one geographic location and covering a 
relatively short period of time is that the results are not confounded by variation in labor 
market conditions. 
4 Johnson and Corcoran (2003) and Heinrich et al. (2005) explore the impact of  
differences across job characteristics on subsequent labor market outcomes among 
welfare recipients and former recipients only. 
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program) for any nine months during the last 18 months, ending on the hiring date.  An 
outside agency hired by the firm identified which employees were welfare hires.
5
  Individual employee records are linked to individual-level and employer-level 
data collected by the Georgia Department of Labor (DOL) and welfare receipt data 
collected by the Georgia Department of Human Resources (DHR).
6  Even though the 
sample is limited to workers employed by this firm in the state of Georgia, the firm has 
multiple establishments in the state, thus all individuals do not work at the same job 
location.  There are 6,421 nonwelfare hires and 271 welfare hires (these numbers include 
both workers who separated and workers who did not separate from the firm).  Sample 
statistics are contained in Table 1. 
[Table 1 here] 
  The means in Table 1 indicate that welfare hires are younger (by three years), 
more likely to be single, black, and female, compared to nonwelfare hires.  The average 
education level of welfare hires is similar to nonwelfare hires, 12.7 years versus 13 years, 
respectively.  Looking at the tenure of those who separated from the firm, welfare hires 
and nonwelfare hires separate at approximately the same time—after 48 days for welfare 
hires and after 47 days for nonwelfare hires, however welfare hires are slightly more 
                                                 
5 There is no way to tell whether a worker identified as a "nonwelfare hire" has ever been 
on welfare.  That individual was merely not identified as recently receiving welfare 
benefits.  It is also not clear whether individuals self-identified themselves as a welfare 
recipient or as a member of a welfare-receiving family.  Any potential contamination of 
the nonwelfare hire sample with individuals who were on welfare but didn't self-identify 
is likely adequately diluted by the large numbers of truly nonwelfare hires.  In addition, 
since this firm had an active welfare hiring program, the usual concerns about the impact 
of employment subsidy programs on employer behavior (e.g., see Tennenwold 1982) are 
not likely relevant. 
6 There was a 100% match between the sub-group from the main data set and the DOL 
and DHR data sets. 
- 4 - 
likely to separate (73 percent) than nonwelfare hires (70 percent).  In addition, the 
reasons for separating are similar across welfare status.
7  Among workers who did not 
separate, welfare hires have, on average, higher tenure, 271 days versus 203 days for 
nonwelfare hires.   
  Welfare hires are less likely to work the night shift, perhaps reflecting the higher 
proportion of women among welfare hires.  The hourly rate of pay is similar, reflecting 
the highly structured pay scale, although hourly pay is skewed more to the right among 
nonwelfare hires.  Welfare hires are slightly less likely to be students and handicapped 
veterans. 
  Both of the analyses described below require that we construct, for each person 
who separates from the original employer and is subsequently employed, an earnings 
variable for the worker's primary job after separating.  The worker’s primary job is 
identified as the first job for this person that appears in the DOL wage files for three 
consecutive quarters after separation.  The wage reported in the interior (i.e., middle) 
quarter is selected as the primary job’s earnings.  This strategy used to identify a person's 
postseparation earnings will be referred to as the "interior job method."  If an individual 
does not have a job appearing for three consecutive quarters, the first instance of a job 
appearing for two consecutive quarters is selected and the highest wage is used.
8  For 
individuals with postseparation earnings, but not having the same job for two or more 
consecutive quarters, the highest postseparation quarterly earnings is used. 
                                                 
7 Reasons for separating in this study include personal reasons (e.g., childcare or 
transportation difficulties), professional reasons (e.g., getting a better job or pay 
dissatisfaction), or being fired for cause.  Laid-off workers are not included since the 
focus is on the impact of individual behavior rather than exogenous demand shocks. 
8 If an individual had more than one job with two or three consecutive quarters appearing 
at the same time, the highest wage job was selected. 
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  Table 2 reports the average postseparation wages by welfare status using 
alternative ways to define an individual’s primary postseparation job.  On the lower end, 
workers' average postseparation quarterly wage is $1,741 for welfare hires and $2,424 for 
nonwelfare hires.  On the upper end, workers' maximum postseparation quarterly wage is 
$3,291 for welfare hires and $4,251 for nonwelfare hires.  Using the methodology 
discussed above (the interior job method), the average postseparation quarterly wage is 
$2,346 for welfare hires and $3,097 for nonwelfare hires.  If individuals not having a job 
for two or more consecutive quarters are excluded (strict interior job method), the 
average quarterly wage rises for both groups ($2,532 for welfare hires and $3,353 for 
nonwelfare hires).  Although the model will be estimated using these various measures of 
postseparation wages, the interior job method is preferred, with the assumption that a job 
lasting two or three consecutive quarters is more representative of an individual’s earning 
capacity than the average or maximum wage received. 
[Table 2 here] 
 
III.  Empirical Methodology 
  A.  The Separation Decision and its Impact on Wages  
  The first analysis is designed to determine what influences a worker's decision to 
separate from the original employer, to explore what impact that decision has on 
earnings, and how welfare hires fare relative to their nonwelfare counterparts.  The 
empirical methodology employed is a switching regression model with selection.  
  The mechanism determining a worker's wage is allowed to differ by a worker's 
separation status.: 
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i Welfare X W υ τ τ τ + + + = 2 1 0 ln
and 








i Welfare X W υ τ τ τ + + + = 2 1 0 ln
where S corresponds to those who separated from the original employer, NS refers to 
those who did not separate, τ  represents the coefficients to be estimated,   represents 
the personal characteristics of age, age squared, previous experience, greater than high 
school education, veteran-handicapped status, female, white, and married.    is a 
dummy variable which equals one if the individual is a welfare hire in the original job, 
and zero otherwise, and 
i X
i Welfare
i υ  represents the random error term.   
  The dependent variable for those who separate is based on the interior 
postseparation quarterly earnings (described in the previous section).  For those who do 
not separate, the dependent variable is the worker's last quarter of earnings in their job 
with the original employer.   
  A naive strategy would be to estimate the coefficients (τ ’s) of equations (1) and 
(2) separately, with the coefficients from equation (1) being estimated by ordinary least 
squares (OLS) on individuals who have separated and the coefficients of equation (2) 
also being estimated by OLS, but this time on individuals who did not separate.  The 
relative wage premium paid to those who separate could then be obtained given the 
coefficient estimates of equations (1) and (2): 
   (3)  i
NS S
i
NS S NS S NS
i
S
i Welfare X W W ) ˆ ˆ ( ) ˆ ˆ ( ) ˆ ˆ ( ˆ ln ˆ ln 2 2 1 1 0 0 τ τ τ τ τ τ − + − + − = −
  However, this estimation procedure may produce biased results since the error 
terms in equations (1) and (2) are not necessarily uncorrelated with the other explanatory 
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variables.  Sample selection results if individuals do not randomly select to separate or 
not.  The goal is to obtain parameter estimates from each equation that will allow us to 
make earnings predictions for those not included in the estimation sample.  Following 
Lee (1978), a probit model is estimated to compute the inverse of the Mills ratios that are 
then included as additional regressors in the wage equations in order to control for the 
possibility of non-random individual selection into the separate and not-separate samples. 
  The unobserved structural probit model is: 




i i Welfare Y W W I η β β β β + + + − + = 3 2 1 0
* ) ln (ln
And, the observed model is: 
   (5) 









 Thus,  when  i I  equals one, a separation is observed, and otherwise no separation 
is observed ( i I = 0).  The vector   consists of the set of variables outlined for equations 
(1) and (2) (except age squared) and the additional dummy variables reflecting whether 
the individual worked the day or night shift.  The shift-of-work dummy variables are 
believed to affect the probability of a worker separating, but to not directly affect one’s 
postseparation wage.  The parameters to be estimated are represented by the
i Y
β s, and 
i η represents a normally distributed random error term whose variance is assumed to 
equal one.   
  Separation from the original employer is modeled as an individual choice since 
roughly 90 percent of those who separate quit for professional or personal reasons and 
one could argue that being fired for cause is a matter of individual (bad) behavior choice, 
rather than involuntary action.  Layoffs are not included in the analysis. 
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  In order to obtain the inverse of the Mills Ratios, the reduced-form probit model 
is derived by substituting equations (1) and (2) for  in the structural 
probit model, equation (4).  Thus, the probability of observing a separation is a function 
of all of the explanatory variables in the model.  Using MLE, coefficient estimates are 
obtained and used to compute the inverse of the Mills ratio (selectivity correction factor), 





i W W −
9
   (6)  )] ˆ ( / ) ˆ ( [ ˆ
i i
S
i F f β β λ − =
   (7)  )] ˆ ( 1 / ) ˆ ( [ ˆ
i i
NS
i F f β β λ − =
where F(.) is the cumulative normal distribution of a standard normal random variable, 
f(.) is the density function of a standard normal random variable, and the  ˆs β  are the 
coefficients from estimating the reduced-form probit. 
  The inverse of the Mills ratio is then added to the corresponding wage equations 
to control for an individual’s probability of separating (or not separating) from the 
original employer: 










i Welfare X W ν λ α α α α + + + + = ˆ ln 3 2 1 0
and 










i Welfare X W ν λ α α α α + + + + = ˆ ln 3 2 1 0
A comparison of the coefficients on the explanatory variables across equations (1') and 
(2') will determine whether there is a differential impact of welfare status (and other 
                                                 
9 The coefficient on  ( ) is the estimated covariance of the error term in the probit 
equation and the error term in the wage equation for separators (non-separators), divided 
by the standard deviation of the probit equation’s error term.  If this coefficient is 
significant, it indicates there is significant self-selection by those who separated (those 
who did not separate). 
S
i λ ˆ NS
i λ ˆ
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characteristics) on postseparation wages, and how well those who separate from the 
original employer fare compared to similar workers who do not separate.   
 
  B.  Postseparation Outcomes 
To focus more closely on the life after an employee separates, workers who 
separated from the original employer are followed for a minimum of two quarters beyond 
the quarter they separated to examine whether they:  (1) returned to welfare (welfare), (2) 
did not report wages (no job), (3) obtained a lower-paying job (job losers), or (4) 
obtained a higher-paying job (job winners).  These mutually exclusive outcomes, which 
will also be referred to as outcomes one, two, three, and four, respectively, are 
determined by comparing the quarterly earnings received during the last quarter of 
employment in the original job with the quarterly earnings reported postseparation by the 
Georgia Department of Labor.
10  If an individual receives welfare benefits in any quarter 
after separating, her outcome is welfare.  Individuals reporting no wages for the entire 
postseparation period, and who do not receive welfare benefits have the outcome "no 
job."
11  Since an individual may have several jobs (i.e., several employers) 
postseparation, a primary job is determined for each individual not in the "welfare" or "no 
job" category.  A worker's postseparation primary job is determined by the "interior job 
method," as described in the Data section.   
Outcome classifications by welfare status are presented in Table 3.  150 people 
(3% of those who separated) have the outcome "welfare," 532 individuals (11%) have the 
                                                 
10 Since the original job wage information is reported hourly, the quarterly wage was 
computed as:  [(hourly pay rate * 20 hours) * 52 weeks] / 4. 
11 Having no wages reported could also mean the individual moved out of Georgia or is 
working at a non-covered (in regards to unemployment insurance) job. 
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outcome "no job," 1,988 individuals (42%) have the outcome "job winner," and 2,015 
(43%) individuals have the outcome "job loser." There are 2,007 individuals (30% of the 
sample) who did not separate.  As one may expect, a larger percentage of welfare hires 
had the outcome "job loser" (48% versus 43% for nonwelfare hires), as well as the 
outcome welfare (16% versus 3% for nonwelfare hires).  A larger percentage of 
nonwelfare hires had the outcome "no job" (12% compared to 6%), perhaps because 
these individuals pursued educational activities, no longer needed to work due to 
financial circumstances, or because they moved out of state. 
[Table 3 here] 
  To model the choice of work status for welfare and nonwelfare hires, a 
multinomial logit model is estimated, based on the four possible outcomes.  The 
individual is assumed to choose the outcome providing her the highest level of utility.  
Let y be the dependent variable with j outcomes, numbered but not assumed to be 
ordered, and define the probability that individual i chooses outcome one (where U refers 
to utility): 
   for j=2, 3, 4.   (8)  ) ( ) 1 ( 1 1 1 ij i U U P y P P > = = =
Thus, the probability of choosing outcome one is the probability that the utility from 
outcome one exceeds the utility from outcomes two, three, and four.  Let the average 
utility associated with choosing outcome j be given as: 
  ij j i ij X U ε β + =  (9) 
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where   is the vector of independent variables which includes dummy variables for 
race, greater than high school education, gender, shift worked at original job, excellent or 
good performance rating while employed at original job, previous employment with the 
original firm, marital status, reason for separating original job, and welfare status; and 
continuous variables for wage rate at original job, age, age squared; and 
i X
j β  is the vector 
of parameters to be estimated.  
 Thus, 






Although the probabilities sum to one, the model is not identified since there is not a 
unique set of parameters which gives rise to the probabilities observed.  To identify the 
model, the parameters associated with outcome four ("job winner") are set equal to zero 






































       for j = 4  (13) 
Following Greene (2000), the log likelihood function is: 
           (14) 
4
11







where   if alternative j is chosen by individual i and 0 if not, for the j possible 
outcomes.  Thus, the estimated coefficients will tell us the percentage change in the odds 
1 = ij d
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of pursuing a particular work status alternative, relative to being a "job winner," for a 
one-unit change in an independent variable.
12  
 
IV.  Empirical Results 
  A.  To-Separate or Not-to-Separate: Implications for Earnings 
  The first order of business is to determine what influences a worker's decision to 
separate from the original employer, to explore what impact that decision has on 
earnings, and how welfare hires fare relative to their nonwelfare counterparts.  Efforts to 
keep welfare hires from separating from their employer may not be called for if they fare 
better, or at least as well as nonwelfare hires, as a result of separating. 
  Results from the first-stage, reduced-form probit model that describes a worker's 
tendency to separate or not, are found in Table 4.
13  At the 90% significance level, 
welfare hires have an increased probability of separating.
14  As expected, workers with a 
greater than high school education also have an increased probability of separating.  Low-
skilled workers with more education likely separate from their job in order to pursue 
more promising employment opportunities than are available to workers with less 
education (see Gunderson and Hotchkiss 2004). Working during the night shift also 
results in a higher probability of separating the original job.  Being a student or having 
                                                 
12 Marginal effects of a unit change in the value of each regressor on the change in the 
probability of a given postseparation outcome will actually be what is discussed below.  
See Greene (2000), pp. 860-1. 
13 545 observations (8.1 percent of the total number of observations) were dropped due to 
having postseparation earnings of zero.  Of the 545, 14 were welfare hires. 
14 Many others have documented high turnover rates among welfare recipients (for 
example, see Berg et al 1992, Holzer et al. 2004, and Johnson and Corcoran 2003).  
While Gunderson and Hotchkiss (2004) also find a higher rate of turnover among welfare 
recipients, they find that the time to separation is slightly longer for welfare hires, relative 
to non welfare hires. 
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worked for the firm before contributes to a significantly lower probability of separating, 
the latter being indicative of this firm being a good job match for certain individuals.  
Also, students may find this type of job a particularly good fit with their academic 
schedule. 
[Table 4 here] 
  Table 5 presents the estimated coefficients from the wage equations (1') and (2').  
The results suggest that being a welfare hire negatively impacts postseparation wages, 
while welfare status does not significantly affect the wages of those who did not 
separate.
15  The implication is that the earnings outcome among those who separate is 
significantly (21 percent) lower for welfare hires than for nonwelfare hires.  In spite of 
the lower earnings outcome among welfare hires that separated, others have found that 
future earnings among these workers are likely to be higher than those of welfare 
recipients that have not had an employment experience (for example, see Heinrich et al. 
2005 and Grogger 2005).  The outcomes analysis to follow will shed light on the reason 
for this lower postseparation earnings outcome of welfare hires. 
[Table 5 here] 
  The selection term,  , is negative and significantly different from zero in the 
wage equation for those who separate.  This indication of negative self-selection suggests 
that an individual who chooses to separate ends up with a lower wage than the average 
person would upon separation.  The insignificance of the selection term in the non-
separating wage equations suggests that those who choose to stay with the original 
λ ˆ
                                                 
15 The estimated coefficients for the non-separation wage equation should be interpreted 
with caution due to the relatively low R
2.  Very low systematic variation across 
regressors is not unexpected as those still employed by the original employer continue to 
have their wages determined by a union-negotiated formula. 
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employer do not fare better or worse than the average worker who stays.  This is not 
surprising given the strong institutional nature of the wage determination through union 
contracts with the original employer. 
  The differences in wage determining mechanisms across the two equations can 
largely be explained by the union influence of wage determination in the original 
employer.  Being older (a rough proxy for overall labor market experience) has a 
significant effect on the wage rate of those who separate, but not on the wage rate of non-
separators.  This result is as expected since overall labor market experience has value in 
general, but may not be correlated with seniority, which appears to be more important in 
the determination of wage with the original employer.  Evidence of this is found in the 
positive and significant coefficient on the Previous Experience (with the firm) regressor; 
among those who remain employed with the original firm, those with previous 
experience with the firm earn 1.6 percent higher wage than those who do not.   
  A greater than high school education increases the wage rate for all workers 
whether they separate from the firm or not, with the impact being much stronger for those 
who separate.  Again likely reflecting the union influence of wage determination, being 
white does not have a significant effect on wages of those who remain employed with the 
original firm, but significantly positively affects wages of those who separate.  It's 
unclear why married workers would earn a higher wage among those who separate, but 
earn a lower wage among those who do not. 
  Estimation of the structural probit model, equation (4), allows us to investigate the 
effect of the wage premium a worker might expect from separating from her job on that 
decision to separate.  If the expected earnings differential positively affects the decision 
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to separate, the coefficient on the term   will be positive and 
significantly different from zero.




i W W −
16  Estimates from the structural probit model are 
presented in Table 6. 
[Table 6 here] 
  The sign on the expected wage difference between separating and not separating 
is positive, although insignificantly different from zero.  The signs, significance, and 
magnitude of the variables in the structural probit are similar to those in the reduced-form 
probit.  The insignificance of the expected wage difference indicates that expected wages 
are not a driving force in the decision to separate from the original employer.  This is not 
entirely unexpected since, as will be seen in the next section, the predicted probabilities 
of a worker that separates ending up with a higher or lower paying job are about the 
same. 
 
  B.  Postseparation Outcomes 
  The analysis of postseparation outcomes will provide some insight as to why 
expected earnings don't seem to influence the separation decision and why, among those 
who separate, welfare hires end up with lower earnings than nonwelfare hires.  Table 7 
contains the marginal effects calculated at the mean for the multinomial logit estimated to 
describe the outcome probabilities of those who separate.
17  These results are 
                                                 
16 The expected wage from separating and from not separating is calculated for all 
observations, regardless of their separation decision.  Having controlled for potential 
selection into each of these states allows us to use the consistent parameter estimates to 
make predictions out-of-sample. 
17 The estimated coefficients are in Appendix tables A1 through A3.  The model was 
estimated using outcomes based on the interior wage job, "strict" interior wage job, 
average wage job, and maximum wage job.  The marginal effects reported are based on 
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generalizable to those who separate from the original employer only and are designed to 
answer the question, "Are welfare hires more likely to end up in a particular 
postseparation outcome than nonwelfare hires with the same characteristics?"   
[Table 7 here] 
  Having a greater than high school education, being white, or married decreases 
the probability that welfare is the outcome after separation.  Individuals who are welfare 
hires, female, or who were fired for cause have an increased probability of having their 
outcome be welfare.  Being a welfare hire increases the probability of a welfare outcome 
by 4.1 percentage points, while being female increases the probability by 8.0 percentage 
points.  This significant tendency to return to welfare among welfare hires is consistent 
with results reported by Hoynes (2000) who finds that the "demand for welfare" persists 
even through improved labor market conditions.  However, Gottschalk (2005) reports 
that exposure to work reduces a recipients demand for welfare through an alteration of 
their beliefs about treatment in the workplace.  This suggests that welfare recidivism in 
this sample is likely lower than among recipients who experience a spell off of welfare 
that did not involve an employment experience.
18  Nam (2005) also finds lower rates of 
recidivism among welfare recipients with labor market experience. 
  The probability of having a "no job" outcome is higher for students, which would 
be expected, and is lower for welfare hires and individuals who quit for professional 
reasons or for being fired for cause.  Most likely, welfare hires are at a reduced 
                                                                                                                                                 
the interior wage job.  Overall, the estimated coefficients do not differ considerably by 
how the postseparation wage was specified.  
18 Furthermore, Carrington et al. (2002) find that welfare recidivism is lower in the post-
welfare reform years than before TANF replaced AFDC. 
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probability of a "no job" outcome because if they truly do not have a job, they have most 
likely returned to welfare.  
  The signs on the marginal effects for the "job winner" and "job loser" outcomes 
are as expected.  A higher wage rate (earned with the original employer), being older, 
having greater than a high school education, or separating for professional reasons 
increases the probability of having the outcome be "job winner."  Females, students, and 
individuals who have previous work experience with the original firm are less likely to 
have a "job winner" outcome, as are individuals who worked the day shift.  Focusing on 
the "job loser" outcome, students, day shift workers, and individuals fired for cause are 
more likely to have this outcome.  A higher wage rate, being older or quitting for 
professional reasons decreases the probability of a "job loser" outcome. 
  These results are consistent with Johnson and Corcoran (2003) who find, among 
welfare recipients/former recipients only, that greater labor market experience and a 
higher original wage rate improve the chances of transitioning into a better job, whereas 
job performance problems lead to a worse job outcome.  Also consistent with Johnson 
and Corcoran, education beyond high school increases the probability of a "job winner" 
outcome and it is also found here to reduce welfare recidivism--an outcome not evaluated 
by Johnson and Corcoran. 
  The results suggest a number of policy implications.  Being fired for cause 
significantly increases the probability of having a welfare or "job loser" outcome.  Since 
one of the main reasons individuals are fired for cause is due to excessive absenteeism 
(68% of workers fired for cause was because of absenteeism), efforts to improve work-
readiness skills may reduce the chances of being fired for cause, and thus increase the 
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chances of having a better outcome in the event of a separation.  Enhancement of work-
readiness skills also appears to have a more positive effect than the actual quality of work 
performed, as represented by the lack of significance of the performance rating dummy 
variable.   
  The results also indicate that having an education greater than high school reduces 
the probability of the outcome being welfare.  Thus, promoting education beyond high 
school would be beneficial and would appear to help reduce the probability of a welfare 
outcome.
19  While perhaps more difficult to design policy for, promotion of marriage 
would also aide in reducing the probability of having a welfare outcome. However, one 
cannot be certain that it is marriage per se that reduces the probability of a welfare 
outcome; it could be unobserved characteristics of married individuals which contributes 
to the reduced probability.  While some virtually unchangeable characteristics, such as 
race and gender, have significant effects on the outcomes estimated, there are some 
characteristics which can be targeted, such as education and work-readiness skills, in 
order to increase the probability of a more desirable outcome. 
  It is also of interest to note that welfare hires were no more or less likely to 
experience a "job winner" or "job loser" outcome than nonwelfare hires, although 78 
percent of welfare hires and 83 percent of nonwelfare hires find themselves in one of 
these two outcomes.  The implication is that when it comes to low-skilled workers 
moving from one job to another, welfare history is not a hindrance (or help) in making a 
                                                 
19 Nam (2005) finds that promotion of education even at lower levels (e.g., high school 
completion) would reduce welfare recidivism, as well. 
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positive transition.
20  This means that  efforts to improve the job transition outcomes 
among welfare hires might very well be best addressed to assist all low-skilled workers; 
there is nothing special about welfare recipients that will make their transition either 
more or less difficult than similarly skilled workers without a welfare history. 
  Since 91% of individuals with the welfare outcome reported at least one quarter 
with positive postseparation wages, the model was re-estimated with three outcomes 
only: "no job," "job winner," and "job loser."
21  The marginal effects are presented in 
Appendix A, Table A4 and resemble the marginal effects calculated from estimating four 
outcomes.
22  Most notably, there is still no significant impact of having a history of 
welfare receipt on ending up with a "job winner" or "job loser" outcome. 
 
V.  Summary and Conclusions 
  The analyses in this paper indicate that while the job separation experience of 
welfare hires is similar in many ways to that of their nonwelfare counterparts, there are 
also some important differences.  The study makes use of unique personnel data from one 
firm and administrative data from the state of Georgia to follow workers who separate 
from their employer to determine how these experiences differ across welfare status. 
                                                 
20 This result is consistent with Loeb and Corcoran (2001) who find that workers of 
similar labor market histories experience similar wage growth, regardless of their welfare 
receipt experiences. 
21 A Small-Hsiao test of the IIA assumption was rejected for the welfare outcome, 
indicating that when the probability of the welfare option changes, the relative choices of 
the other outcomes changes.  See Small and Hsiao (1985). 
22 Two exceptions are the female dummy variable coefficient, which is now significantly 
positive in the "job loser" outcome, and the white dummy variable coefficient, which is 
now significantly negative in the "job loser" outcome. 
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  Welfare hires are found to be more likely to separate from their job and they can 
expect lower postseparation earnings, on average, than their nonwelfare counterparts.  
This suggests that job-stability efforts concentrated on welfare recipients has merit.  
Furthermore, promoting education beyond high school would improve the postseparation 
earnings outcome among both welfare and nonwelfare hires.  Evidence that separation 
decisions of both types of workers are being driven by factors other than expected higher 
earnings on a subsequent job is also presented. 
  An analysis of job separation outcomes confirms that those who separate are, for 
all practical purposes, equally likely to find themselves in higher or lower paying jobs 
than the one they left, regardless of whether they were a welfare or nonwelfare hire on 
the original job.  However, those identified as welfare hires with the original employer 
are significantly more likely than nonwelfare hires to end up on welfare after separation.  
This suggests that "welfare" presents itself as a more viable postseparation outcome for 
those with previous experience of receiving welfare.   
  Having been "fired for cause" (regardless of welfare status) also increases the 
probability (by 1.8 percentage points) that a worker who separates ends up on welfare 
and increases the probability even more (by 7.6 percentage points) that the worker ends 
up in a lower paying job from which they were fired.  Therefore, improving job-readiness 
skills (i.e., reducing the odd of being fired for cause) and promotion of education beyond 
high school would improve the job separation outcomes of all workers.  However, it 
appears that extra effort concentrated on welfare hires is warranted, given that they are 
significantly more likely to end up on welfare after separation than their nonwelfare 
counterparts. 
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Table 1:  Means of Selected Variables 
Variable  Nonwelfare Hires  Welfare Hires 












Day shift = 1  0.23  0.41 
Night shift = 1  0.40  0.20 
Twilight or Sunrise shift = 1  0.37  0.39 
Previous experience with original employer = 1  0.02  0.003 
Excellent or good performance rating = 1  0.09  0.10 








     Workers who did not separate  203 (156) 
[4, 729] 
271 (155) 
[ 17, 725] 
Separate = 1  0.70  0.73 
     For professional reasons   0.30  0.27 
     For personal reasons  0.62  0.63 
     For being fired for cause  0.08  0.10 
Female =1  0.17  0.34 
White =1  0.13  0.03 
Black =1  0.82  0.97 
Single =1  0.80  0.92 
Vet-handicapped =1  0.11  0.07 
Student = 1  0.20  0.18 
Maximum welfare benefit (pre-separation)




Maximum welfare benefit (postseparation)




Number of Observations  6,421  271 
Standard deviation is in parenthesis.  Minimums and maximums are in brackets. 
a Excludes zeros.  The percent of welfare and nonwelfare hires receiving benefits was 13 
and 2 percent, respectively. 
b Excludes zeros.  The percent of welfare and nonwelfare hires receiving benefits was 12 
and 2 percent, respectively. 
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Table 2:  Postseparation Quarterly Earnings 
 
Variable  Nonwelfare Hires  Welfare Hires 








Postseparation Strict Interior Job Wage
a $ 3,353 (3290) 
[0, 64603] 
$2,532   (2225) 
[0, 10736] 








Number of Observations (separators)  4,486  199 
aNOBS = 3,852 for nonwelfare hires and 173 for welfare hires.   








Table 3:  Outcomes by Welfare Status 
 
Outcome  Entire Sample  Nonwelfare Hires  Welfare Hires 
Did not separate  2,007  1,935  72 
Welfare  150 (3%)  118 (3%)  32  (16%) 
No Job  532 (11%)  521 (12%)  11  (6%) 
"Job Winner"  1,988 (42%)  1,928 (43%)  60  (30%) 
"Job Loser"  2,015 (43%)  1,919 (43%)  96  (48%) 
Number of Observations  6,692  6,421  271 
Percent of those who separated is in parenthesis.
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Age squared  -0.000 
(0.000) 
Previous Experience  -0.576 
(0.128)*** 
























Standard errors are in parenthesis.  *** indicates significant at the 99% level; ** indicates 
significant at the 95% level; * indicates significant at the 90% level 
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Table 5:  Coefficients from Wage Equations Adjusted for Selectivity 
 


















































2 0.1501 0.0241 
Number of Observations  4,140  2,007 
Standard errors are in parenthesis and have been adjusted using Heckman’s (1979) 
consistent estimator.  *** indicates significant at the 99% level; ** indicates significant at 
the 95% level; * indicates significant at the 90% level 
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Previous Experience  -0.571 
(0.128)*** 


























Standard errors are in parenthesis.  *** indicates significant at the 99% level; ** indicates 
significant at the 95% level; * indicates significant at the 90% level 
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Table 7:  Marginal Effects from Multinomial Logit 
 
Variable  Welfare  No Job  Job Loser  Job Winner 








































































































































Pr(Outcome|X)  1.58% 11.51% 35.02% 51.90% 
Percent of Sample 
(NOBS) 
3.20% 
    (150) 
11.36% 
   (532) 
42.43% 
  (1,988) 
43.01% 
  (2,015) 
NOBS = 4,685.   Standard errors are in parenthesis.  Outcomes based on using interior 
wage job.  *** indicates significant at the 99% level; ** indicates significant at the 95% 
level; * indicates significant at the 90% level. 
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Appendix A: Multinomial Logit Parameter Estimates. 
 
Table A1:  Coefficients from Multinomial Logit: Outcome = Welfare 
 


















































































































































Log Likelihood  -4537.412  -3912.898  -4458.697  -4101.486 
Pseudo R
2 0.0946 0.0963  0.1212 0.1040 
NOBS Welfare 
Outcome 
150 150 150 150 
NOBS=4,685.  Standard errors are in parenthesis.  *** indicates significant at the 99% 
level; ** indicates significant at the 95% level; * indicates significant at the 90% level.  
Coefficients are estimated relative to the "Job Winner" category. 
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Table A2:  Coefficients from Multinomial Logit: Outcome = No Job 
 


















































































































































Log Likelihood  -4537.412  -3912.898  -4458.697  -4101.486 
Pseudo R
2 0.0946 0.0963  0.1212 0.1040 
NOBS No Job 
Outcome 
532 532  532  532 
NOBS=4,685.  Standard errors are in parenthesis.  *** indicates significant at the 99% 
level; ** indicates significant at the 95% level; * indicates significant at the 90% level.  
Coefficients are estimated relative to the "Job Winner" category. 
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Table A3:  Coefficients from Multinomial Logit: Outcome = Job Loser 
 


















































































































































Log Likelihood  -4537.412  -3912.898  -4458.697  -4101.486 
Pseudo R
2 0.0946 0.0963  0.1212 0.1040 
NOBS Job Loser 
Outcome 
2,015 1,450 2,577 1,387 
NOBS=4,685.  Standard errors are in parenthesis.  *** indicates significant at the 99% 
level; ** indicates significant at the 95% level; * indicates significant at the 90% level.  
Results using the worker's postseparation average wage are identical to those using the 
interior job method.  Coefficients are estimated relative to the "Job Winner" category. 
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Table A4:  Marginal Effects from Restricted Multinomial Logit: Three Outcomes Only 
 
Variable  No Job  Job Loser  Job Winner 




































































































Pr(Y|X) 11.94%  45.14%  42.92% 




       (545) 
44.97% 
        (2,107) 
43.39% 
    (2,033) 
NOBS = 4,685.   Standard errors are in parenthesis.  Outcomes based on using interior 
wage job.  Percent of classification is in parenthesis.  Log Likelihood = -3994.428; 
psuedo R
2=0.0951.  *** indicates significant at the 99% level; ** indicates significant at 
the 95% level; * indicates significant at the 90% level. 
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